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Abstract
The German economy has widely been seen as failing to develop commercial
innovation competencies necessary to compete in biotechnology, information
technology, and other emerging new industries. Starting in the mid-1990s the
German government has instituted a series of new technology policies designed to
orchestrate the development of small entrepreneurial technology firms. These
policies have fostered several hundred new entrepreneurial start-ups in Germany,
many of which have adopted strategies that differ dramatically from those commonly
associated with small and medium sized German firms. Developments in Germany
represent an interesting challenge to prevailing institutional theory as applied to the
study of advanced industrial economies, which tends to view the characteristics of
organizations as strongly constrained by the orientation of a number of key national
institutional frameworks. Focusing on biotechnology, this article examines the
relative importance of national institutional frameworks as opposed to sector-specific
policies that are presently pervasive in Germany. Analysis of the new firms
demonstrates that Germany’s new technology policies have facilitated important
extensions within the business system that have, for the first time, allowed the
systematic promotion of entrepreneurial technology companies. However, the
dominant strategies of market specialization and company organizational patterns
found within these companies have been strongly influenced by incentives and
constraints created by long-established national institutional structures.
Zusammenfassung
Bis vor kurzem war es vorherrschende Meinung, daß die deutsche Volkswirtschaft
es versäumt hatte, marktorientierte Innovationskompetenzen zu entwickeln, um in
Biotechnologie, Informationstechnologie und anderen neuen Hochtechnologie-
branchen erfolgreich am Wettbewerb teilnehmen zu können. Seit Mitte der
neunziger Jahre verfolgt die Bundesregierung eine neue Technologiepolitik mit dem
Ziel, die Entwicklung kleiner Hochtechnologieunternehmen zu initiieren und zu
unterstützen. Dies führte bisher zu mehreren hundert Neugründungen. Die
Unternehmensstrategien vieler dieser Unternehmen weichen sehr stark von jenen
Handlungsmustern ab, die normalerweise mit den kleinen und mittelständischen
deutschen Unternehmen assoziiert werden.
Diese Entwicklungen in Deutschland stellen eine interessante Herausforderung
an die vorherrschende Institutionentheorie dar, wie sie zur Analyse hochentwickelter
Volkswirtschaften verwendet wird. Danach werden die spezifischen Merkmale von
Unternehmen weitgehend als Folge prägender nationaler institutioneller Rahmen-
bedingungen verstanden.
In der vorliegenden Studie der Biotechnologie-Branche wird der relative Einfluß
nationaler Institutionengefüge als ein gegensätzlicher Ansatz zu den in Deutschland
noch vorherrschenden sektorspezifischen Politiken untersucht. Die Analyse der
neugegründeten Unternehmen zeigt, daß diese neue Technologiepolitik den Weg zu
erweiterten Möglichkeiten im ökonomischen Handeln geebnet und damit zum ersten
Mal die systematische Förderung von Hochtechnologie-Unternehmen ermöglicht hat.
Trotzdem: Die vorherrschenden Strategien der Spezialisierung auf definierte Märkte
und die Organisationsmuster der untersuchten Unternehmen werden nach wie vor
von den Anreizen und Einschränkungen des lange bestehenden nationalen Insti-
tutionengefüges stark geprägt.
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11. Introduction
Through the 1980s and early 1990s the German economy has widely been seen as
failing to develop commercial innovation competencies necessary to compete in
biotechnology, information technology, and other emerging new industries (Soskice,
1997; Streeck, 1996; Casper and Vitols, 1997). Poor competitive performance in
these high-tech sectors is indicative of a broader failure of the German economy to
develop clusters of entrepreneurial science-based firms that have been a major
catalyst of technological development in the United States. Starting in the mid-1990s
the German government has instituted a series of new technology policies designed
to orchestrate the development of small entrepreneurial firms. These policies have
fostered several hundred new entrepreneurial start-ups in Germany, many of which
have adopted strategies that differ dramatically from those commonly associated
with small and medium sized German firms. Developments in Germany represent an
interesting challenge to prevailing institutional theory as applied to the study of
advanced industrial economies, which tends to view the characteristics of
organizations as strongly constrained by the orientation of a number of key national
institutional frameworks. Focusing on biotechnology, this article examines the
relative importance of national institutional frameworks as opposed to sector-specific
policies that are presently pervasive in Germany. Through doing so, it attempts to
create an analytic framework with which to appraise patterns of institutional
adaptation within the economy.
The recent renaissance in the fortunes of German high-technology industry, and
in particular the strong role of government technology policies in the creation of
these new firms, has given empirical support for a new perspective on the role of
institutions in the governance of the economy, what I call the „resource
orchestration“ approach. It suggests that government policies can create customized
institutional frameworks to support particular sectors.  To foster new technology
firms, the German government has crafted new technology transfer programs, built
science parks, dispersed financial subsidies and research and development grants
for start-up firms, and sponsored a series of minor financial reforms to introduce
American-style capital markets for technology firms in Germany. This view strongly
opposes a long line of research generally supporting a „varieties of capitalism“
theoretical perspective, which suggests that differences in national institutional
architectures are responsible for stark patterns of industrial specialization across the
advanced industrial economies. Within this framework, it has been repeatedly
argued that German institutional frameworks create obstacles to the construction of
entrepreneurial technology firms engaging in radical innovation activities, but
advantage the organization of competencies needed for a variety of industries that
rely on continuous process innovations within sophisticated, but established
technologies.
2Through comparison with the United States, this article examines how national
institutional frameworks are combining with resources and incentives created by
Germany’s new technology policies to encourage particular strategies of commercial
innovation by entrepreneurial biotechnology firms. To do so, I examine different
segments of the bio-medical related biotechnology industry, and in particular
contrast a number of key technological characteristics and related organizational
dilemmas pervasive within two such segments, therapeutics and platform
technologies. Industry specialization data reveal that German firms have
overwhelmingly chosen to specialize in the platform technology segment of
biotechnology, while firms in the United States, though also present in the platform
technology field, tend to dominate the therapeutics segment.
Explaining this divergent pattern of specialization is the primary empirical puzzle
of the paper. While firms in each of these segments are „entrepreneurial“ in the
sense that most firms are small, technology oriented, and have rapid growth
potential, important differences exist in a number of organizational dilemmas faced
by firms. I examine differences in the broad technological regime underpinning
therapeutics and platform technology segments of biotechnology in order to assess
different organizational dilemmas posed by the two segments. These include
differences in the financial risks, employee motivational problems, and the
orchestration of adequate human resources. I then assess how sector specific
technology policies interact with national institutional frameworks to influence the
ability of firms to solve these organizational dilemmas.
To establish these points, the article is structured around three empirical
sections followed by a conclusion. First, to frame the debate and introduce key
concepts, I discuss competing institutional perspectives on the sources of
organizational structures within technologically innovative commercial environments.
Second, I analyze technological regime characteristics and related
organizational dilemmas of the therapeutics and platform technology segments of
biotechnology. Through comparison with the United States, the final empirical
section examines how German institutional structures influence the orchestration of
commercial innovation within both industry segments, and in particular how key
organizational dilemmas are resolved. The paper concludes with a discussion on the
sources of institutional adaptiveness within the German economy and the
implications of this research for comparative institutional theory of the firm and its
environment.
32. Institutions and national patterns of innovation: two perspectives
a) The „varieties of capitalism“ perspective
Institutional scholars within the comparative political economy and organizational
studies fields have examined variations in economy-wide national institutional
frameworks and suggested how particular institutional configurations advantage the
construction of different organizational patterns within the economy. Crouch and
Streeck, 1997; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Whitley 1999; Soskice 1994).
Because Germany and the United States have been identified as advanced
industrial countries with widely dissimilar national institutional framework
configurations, much theoretical analysis has centered on US-German comparisons
(see Soskice, 1997).
Germany may be characterized as a „coordinated market economy“ (Soskice,
1994) underpinned by a regulatory private law system. The law is regulative in the
sense that it designates statutory bargaining rights to unions, employers, and other
social actors within the business system, while granting courts extensive powers to
police the distribution of risks within contracts. Non-market forms of business
coordination are facilitated by the embeddedness of large firms within networks of
powerful trade and industry associations, as well as a similar, often legally
mandated, organization of labor and other interest organizations within para-public
institutions (Katzenstein, 1987, 1989). Businesses engage these associations to
solve a variety of incomplete contracting dilemmas and create important non-market
collective goods.  To discourage individual companies from exiting the collective
business system, German public policy relies on the legal system to regulate a wide
variety of inter-firm and labor contracts as well as sustain neo-corporatist bargaining
environments through the delegation of issue-area specific bargaining rights to
unions and other stake-holders within firms (Keller, 1991).
By contrast, the United States is characterized by a liberal market economy.
Business coordination depends primarily on market oriented transactions and the
use of a flexible, enabling private legal system to facilitate a variety of complex
contracting situations. Because courts refuse to adjudicate incomplete contracts (see
Schwarz, 1992), market participants need to specify control rights in contract to as
full an extent as possible or, when this is not possible, use extremely high-powered
performance incentives to align interests within and across organizations
(Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; more generally Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Table 1
outlines the main institutional differences across the two countries.
These contrasting patterns of market regulation and business coordination have
lead to substantial differences in the organization of company-level activities.
Systematic differences in the organization of careers, in patterns of company
4organization, and in relationships between firms and owners and investors exist
across the two countries. Analysts have linked these differences in company
organizational structures to the broad pattern of industry specialization and
innovation patterns across Germany and the United States. I will now outline the
German case in more detail, using somewhat stereotypical descriptions that, we will
see when discussing the biotechnology case in more detail, have begun to evolve in
recent years.
First, how are careers for scientists and managers organized? In Germany most
employees spend most of their careers within one firm, often after a formal
apprenticeship or, in the case of many engineers and scientists, an internship
arranged in conjunction with their university degree. While there exist no formal laws
stipulating lifetime employment, German labor has used its power on supervisory
boards as well as its formal consultative rights under codetermination law over
training, work-organization, and hiring, to demand unlimited employment contracts
(Streeck, 1984). Once the lifetime employment norm for skilled workers was
established, it spread to virtually all mid-level managers and technical employees.
One result of life-time employment is that the active labor market for mid-career
managers and scientists is limited (see Lehrer, 1997, Monks and Minow, 1995: 287-
295).
Long-term employment and the „stakeholder“ model of corporate governance
have important repercussions for patterns of company organization (Charkham,
1995; Lane, 1989; Vitols et al., 1997). Long-term employment and codetermination
rights for employees create incentives for management to create a broad consensus
across the firm when making major decisions. Because unilateral decision-making is
limited, it is difficult for German firms to create strong performance incentives for
individual managers. As a result, performance rewards tend to be targeted at groups
rather than individuals within German firms. Until early 1998 stock options, one of
the most common incentive instruments used in American firms, were illegal in
Germany. Finally, most career structures are well defined in German firms and
based on broad education and experience within the firm, rather than short-term
performance.
Ownership and financial relationships in Germany are strongly influenced by
corporate governance rules. Despite the recent expansion of equity markets,
Germany remains a bank-centered financial system. Banks and other large financial
actors (e.g. insurance companies) have a strong oversight role on firms through
seats on the supervisory board and through continuing ownership or proxy-voting
ties with most large German industrial enterprises (Edwards and Fischer, 1994;
Vitols, 1995). Most German firms rely on banks or retained earnings to finance
investments. Banks can often adopt a longer term focus in part because they know
that German firms are able to offer sustained commitments to employees and other
stakeholders to the firm, and can often closely monitor the status of their investments
through seats on the supervisory board or other direct contacts.
5Proponents of the varieties of capitalism perspective argue that German
patterns of market coordination facilitate the creation of organizational competencies
necessary for firms competing in sectors characterized by incremental innovation
processes within established industries, such as many segments within the metal-
working, engineering, and chemicals sectors (Streeck, 1992). Deep patterns of
vocational training within firms, consensual decision-making, long-term employment,
and patient finance are all linked to the systematic exploitation of particular
technologies to a wide variety of niche markets, a strategy Sorge and Streeck label
„diversified quality production“ or „DQP“ (Sorge and Streeck, 1988).  On the other
hand, scholars have suggested that the regulative nature of German economic
institutions combined with pervasive non-market patterns of coordination within the
economy create constraints against the organization of industries that best perform
within shorter-term, market based patterns of coordination (Soskice, 1997). The
American institutional environment, due to it’s more flexible but short-term oriented
system of company organization and finance, is seen to facilitate more „radical“ or
product based innovation strategies.
The general implication of the varieties of capitalism view is that national
patterns of specialization will be enduring.  Short of fundamental institutional
change, policies designed to promote the creation of industries that are not favored
by the country’s patterns of comparative institutional advantage will be unsuccessful.
This leads to the conclusion that country-specific policies should be crafted to „fine-
tune“ their particular institutionally derived location advantages, rather than attempt
to craft policies to compete in industries requiring institutional supports at odds with
the prevailing logic within the economy.
b) The resource orchestration perspective
While industry specialization patterns from the 1980s and early 90s broadly support
the varieties of capitalism view (Cantwell and Harding, 1998; Casper et al., 1999),
recent developments in Germany have been interpreted to strongly contradict it.
During the later half of the 1990s Germany has witnessed the beginning of what
many commentators, particularly within the business press, are proclaiming to be a
renaissance in the performance of its high-technology industries (Wirtschaftswoche,
1998). In particular, a number of new technology policies are being credited with an
expansion of entrepreneurial start-up firm activity. Biotechnology has been the
sector with the most drastic reversal of fortune. Hampered by a hostile regulatory
environment for genetic research throughout the 1980s and early 1990s in addition
to institutional constraints, there were very few commercial biotechnology labs
created in Germany, either by established large pharmaceutical firms or start-ups.
However, starting with a liberalization of genetic testing regulations in 1993 and,
beginning in 1995 with the introduction of substantial technology promotion
6programs for biotechnology, over five hundred new biotechnology start-up firms have
been created in Germany in recent years, most centered around German university
and public research institutes (Ernst and Young, 1998c. Similar expansions of
commercial activity have taken place in other technology sectors, in particular
software and telecommunications (Casper et. al., 1999).
During the mid-1990s a widespread discussion over its „innovation crisis“ raged
within Germany. This debate has lead to the introduction of a substantially different
analysis of the sources of commercial innovation within the economy, focusing less
on national institutional determinants of innovation processes and more on the
orchestration of resources and organizational competencies deemed necessary to
innovate in particular sectors. The new sentiment is found in a recent report by the
IFO-institute, a respected voice on German competitiveness issues: „If there is an
‘innovation crisis’ in Germany, then this ‘crisis’ is due…to a high degree of inertia in
shifting capital investments, human resources, and existing ingenuity talents from
traditional to new high-tech areas promising higher growth rates in the future.“
(Buechtemann and Ludwig, 1996:36; see also Audretsch 1985). The implication of
the resource orchestration view is that the government should search for obstacles
blocking innovation processes within particular sectors and introduce new policies to
transfer resources and orchestrate the coordination of the necessary linkages within
the innovation chain.
Following this logic, the German government has introduced a range of new
technology policies designed to create clusters of entrepreneurial start-up firms, and
in particular spin-offs from universities. University spin-offs have been one of the
strongest sources of high-technology growth in the United States (Rosenberg and
Nelson, 1994). German commentators have noted a number of obstacles to the
creation of small entrepreneurial science-based firms with strong links to
universities. In Germany the relationship between universities and the private sector
is strong, but the primary technology link has been with large firms (Abramson et
al.,1997). Under German law professors own most intellectual property and
generally have long-term relationships with established firms. Universities have thus
had little incentive to establish technology transfer labs. Rsearch within the bio-
medical sciences and other „pure“ research fields has until recently been conducted
with minimal attention to possible commercial spin-offs. As a result, the small-firm
spin-off dynamic that has become commonplace within the United States has failed
to develop within Germany.
Taking careful note of these and other „obstacles“ to the establishment of small
entrepreneurial start-up firms, German public officials at the federal and state level
have in recent years crafted a dense network of support policies. These initiatives,
outlined within table 2, have explicitly attempted to orchestrate various linkages in
the commercial innovation process, particularly focusing on university spin-offs.
Biotechnology has been the most active area of governmental intervention. As part
of a federally funded „BioRegio“ competition that began in 1995, 17 different German
7regions have created government biotechnology promotion offices. While regional
experimentation has lead to some variation in the implementation of particular
programs, technology offices generally aim to help scientists and local entrepreneurs
organize virtually every phase of start-up formation within the biotechnology sector.
This includes the hiring of consultants to persuade university professors or their
students to commercialize their research findings and help them design viable
business plans, subsidies to help defray the costs of patenting their intellectual
property, and the provision of management consulting and partnering activities once
new firms are founded. Most of the BioRegio programs have used public funds to
create new technology parks and „incubator labs“ to house fledging start-ups in and
around universities or public research labs.
The technology transfer offices created through the BioRegio programs are also
the main coordinators for the disbursement of an array of grants, loans, and subsidy
programs created in recent years for high-tech start-ups. In 1996 the German federal
government, wary of criticisms of the lack of venture capital in Germany, decided to
provide „public venture capital“ in the form of „sleeping“ or silent equity partnerships
from federal sources (see Adelberger, 1999). The public agency created to oversee
this program, the tbg, has provided on average over 200 million DM to new start-up
firms over each of the last three years, with biotech firms being the largest recipient
of seed-capital (some 22% of start-ups as of March 1999, according to officials
working within the tbg). To increase their leverage and reduce the risk of
opportunism, federal funds have generally been provided only when firms can obtain
matching funds from „lead investors“ within the private economy. In addition, the
German Research Ministry has provided over DM 150 million in grants for „pre-
competitive“ research and development by start-up firms; money that has often been
matched by groups of local large firms or government funds within individual
BioRegions.
The German government has also worked with the financial community to
introduce measures designed to stimulate the provision of higher risk investment
capital and allow technology firms to undertake rapid growth trajectories commonly
seen within American technology clusters. These reforms include the creation in
1997 of a new stock exchange, the Neuer Markt, with substantially less burdensome
listing requirements than those that exist for the main stock market, and the
introduction in March 1998 of a change in corporate law that allows firms to more
easily buy and sell their own shares (a prerequisite for stock option plans commonly
used by US technology firms).
These new technology policies have been enacted in an environment that has
seen no major changes to the broader economy-wide institutional frameworks that
proponents of the varieties of capitalism perspective stress to be so central. No
reforms to German labor law, codetermination law, or company law appear to be on
the horizon. Compared to the US or the UK Germany is still a primarily bank-
centered financial system; at the end of 1996 German market capitalization was only
821% of GDP, compared to 151% in the United Kingdom and 121% in the United
States (deutsche Bundesbank, 1997).
When the success of recent German technology policies is taken into account
with the overall stability of German national institutional frameworks governing the
economy, the resource orchestration perspective contains a markedly different view
of the degree to which organizational structures within the economy are embedded
within institutions. It suggests that sector-specific support structures can essentially
circumvent the „normal“ institutional incentives and constraints within the economy. If
correct, this has important repercussions for the debate on the sources of
organizational competitiveness and on public policy more generally. A „hybridization“
of a country’s institutional framework could occur (see Lane, 1999; Glimstedt, 1999).
Firms with strategies that are advantaged by a country’s „normal“ institutional
infrastructure could continue to engage those institutions when creating their
organizational structures. Firms seeking to generate organizational structures in
institutionally impoverished areas could do so through engaging specialized
institutions created through sector specific technology policies. A plurality of
institutional support systems, targeted at the unique needs of firms with particular
organizational needs, might conceivably be created.
The recent expansion of German biotechnology and other high-tech industries
demonstrates that a simplistic, static version of the varieties of capitalism approach
is inadequate to explain instances of organizational change within the economy.
Patterns of industrial organization have adapted within Germany to the innovative
challenges posed by biotechnology and other new technologies, and technology
policies have played a key role. A key question for research is to assess the degree
to which these developments are discontinuous with general patterns of market
regulation and industry coordination within the German economy. The varieties of
capitalism and resource orchestration approaches both view institutional
environments as critical determinants of organizational structure and, in effect,
competitive performance. Micro-level research is required to assess how particular
institutional frameworks are influencing the organizational characteristics of firms
and other actors within commercial innovation networks. I now examine the
biotechnology case more carefully.
3. Technology regimes and organizational dilemmas within
biotechnology
When considering biotechnology, public attention has focused primarily on one
segment of this industry, therapeutics. This is the area where spectacular advances
have been made in the harnessing of molecular biology and genetic engineering
9techniques to understand the precise mechanisms underlying particular
physiological processes and the discovery, or more often, design, of a variety of new
treatments against disease. However, industry analysts have long noted that, even
within bio-medical related biotechnology several important market segments exist.
Table 3 defines the four most important market segments, using standard industry
definitions and examples.
Particularly important in recent years has been the rise of numerous high-value
added „platform technologies.“ Firms in this market segment attempt to create
enabling technologies that are then sold to other research labs. Products include
consumable kits used to rationalize or automate common molecular biology lab
processes, such as the cloning of target strains of DNA for lab work (PCR) or the
purification of DNA and other important molecules. Platform technology firms have
also developed a number of information technology based applications that have
been used to revolutionize many aspects of the discovery process within
therapeutics. These include extremely high throughput „combinatorial chemistry“
applications to aid the screening of potential therapeutic compounds and the
development of genetic sequencing and modeling techniques to aid in the quest to
fully decode and understand the human genome („genomics“).
Important differences in patterns of sub-sector specialization exist between
Germany and the United States. In addition to manufacturing and contract research
activities which tend to be represented in all countries with large public or private
medical research sectors, Germany’s new biotechnology firms, with few exceptions,
have overwhelmingly chosen to specialize in platform technology areas, while very
few firms have become pure therapeutic research laboratories. For example, a
recent survey of European biotechnology firms asked over 300 firms to identify all
market sectors in which they conduct activities. While close to 40% of European
biotech firms are developing therapeutic products, less than 20% of German firms
are in this field. Conversely, about 30% of German firms are developing platform
technologies, compared to less than 20% for the European industry as a whole
(Ernst and Young, 1998b 19). When German biotech firms were asked to list the
areas of their research activities, therapeutics came in fifth, ranked well below
contract research and manufacturing, platform technologies, diagnostics, and „other
services.“ (Ernst and Young, 1998b: 17).
More impressionistic field research yields a much stronger trend towards
specialization in platform technologies than indicated in this survey data. As part of a
research project on German biotechnology, I have attended roundtable
presentations by leading German biotechnology firms at European and German
industry conventions, conducted interviews at several of the leading German
biotechnology firms, and also interviewed technology promotion officers in the four
largest German biotechnology clusters. During this research I have failed to identify
any German firms that conducts pure product based therapeutics research along
typical applied biomedical research models often used by US drug discovery start-
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ups. Of the two German firms that have taken public stock listings and the four that
are currently in the run-up stage, all are platform technology firms
(Wirtschaftswoche, 1998).  Most German „therapeutics“ firms are actually conduct
contract genomics based research for pharmaceutical firms or therapeutics research
firms. These firms may someday develop medical research competencies along the
lines of leading US genomics firms, such as Incyte or Millenium Pharmaceuticals.
However, so far only one prominent German genomics firm, the Genome
Pharmaceutical Corporation near Munich, has developed internal medical research
competencies, but only after this lab was financed by a large „pre-competitive“
research grant from the Bavarian government in late 1998.
As the location of the world’s overwhelmingly dominant biotechnology sector,
many American firms have also specialized in platform technologies, but are also
present in very large numbers in therapeutic areas. There are presently over 100
publicly traded biotechnology firms in the United States, most of which conduct
active therapeutics research (see SG Cowen, 1999). This does not include dozens
of privately held firms, not to mention the many hundreds of firms that have failed or
have lost their autonomy through merger and acquisition activities (see Florida and
Kenney, 1988; Senker, 1996).
An interesting empirical puzzle is thus why German firms have gravitated
towards platform technologies while firms in the United States have tended to
develop far more firms within the therapeutics area. One way to understand
differences across the therapeutics and platform technology segments is to analyze
several underlying technological and market characteristics of the two market
segments. Differences in the underlying „technological regime“ underpinning these
market segments can be used to identify a series of organizational dilemmas created
for firms operating within each segment. While there are numerous competing
technological regime classifications, here I draw on a typology developed by
Breschi, Malerba, and Orsenigo in their efforts to examine sectoral systems of
innovation (Breschi and Malerba, 1997; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993). They examine
four broad characteristics: opportunity condtions, levels of appropriability,
technology trajectories within the industry (also known as „cumulativeness“), and the
nature of technological knowledge. I will now examine each of these areas, paying
particular attention to the degree of cumulativeness and the nature of knowledge,
characteristics where important differences exist across the two sub-sectors.
Opportunity conditions correspond to the likelihood that particular investments
will yield commercially relevant innovations, and are generally high for both
therapeutics and platform technology firms. Intellectual property in therapeutics is
very fragmented across literally hundreds of separate research trajectories. To place
the extreme openness of the biotechnology field in perspective, consider that while
scientists have uncovered tens of thousands of possible genetic targets within the
human genome, the entire collection of drugs on the market today act through only
400 targets (SG Cowen, 1998: 23). Though patents for individual drugs (and gene
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sequences) are strong, intellectual property across these separate research clusters
has generally not overlapped in such a way as to „block“ on-going research within
competing research clusters. For example, in an extensive mapping of research
clusters working to develop therapies for Alzeihmer’s Disease, Pennan (1996)
identified some 15 distinct research programs racing against each other. To give an
indication of the ease of entry, according to a recent industry analysis, some 90% of
patented drugs have direct competitors, and there exist three or more direct
competitors for 15 of the 20 top selling drugs (Powell, 1996: 204).
A similar situation exists within the platform technology field. The extremely
large billion dollar plus research and development budgets of large pharmaceutical
firms combined with the smaller budgets of thousands of biotech start-ups and non-
profit medical research labs to create a vast market for products that simplify bio-
medical research processes.  Over time, the platform technology field might become
more concentrated along a normal technological life-cycle logic as a smaller number
of truly effective technological approaches develop and begin to be exploited by
early innovators and consolidated into integrated „solutions“ that are sold to labs.
However, because the segment has only developed into a major market niche in the
last few years, it still is at the beginning of such a cycle, in which the opportunities
for entry are extremely broad.
The level of appropriability relates to the ease with which the firm or networks of
firms involved in the innovative activity can protect the innovation from imitation, and
ranges from high to low (see Teece, 1986). Appriability conditions are often
problematic for firms in both therapeutics and platform technology segments, though
somewhat offset by the huge size of potential markets for products created by each
type of firm. Biotechnology firms currently develop within a strongly constraining
industrial environment imposed by the preexisting structure of the global
pharmaceutical industry and university based bio-medical research (McKlevey,
1997). Within the pharmaceutical industry, only about 20% of total research and
discovery expenditures are spent on the discovery of new therapeutic compounds –
the major activity affected by therapeutic biotechnology firms. The remaining 80% of
R&D is spent on the development of candidate compounds, including highly
specialized activities such as several stages of preclinical and clinical trials and the
submission of extremely complicated statistical studies that are necessary for
regulatory approval. The market and distribution of new drugs – which according to
one industry analysis is in itself as costly to pharmaceutical firms as research and
develop (McGahan, 1994) – also remains primarily dominated by large
pharmaceutical concerns. With the partial exception of Amgen and Genentech, two
of the original biotechnology companies which have used high profits to transform
themselves into small integrated pharmaceutical houses, virtually all new drugs
discovered by biotechnology firms have been brought to market through alliances or
direct sales of candidate compounds with established pharmaceutical companies.
Therapeutic firms must manage risky, long-term alliances with pharmaceutical firms
in a way that does not lead to a substantial transfer of rents generated by the firm’s
discoveries to integrated pharmaceutical firms.
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Platform technology firms also face appropriability risks, but of a somewhat
different nature. Intellectual property is not as strong as that within therapeutics,
meaning that several firms usually enter technology areas with particularly lucrative
returns.  Within the lab technology area, services seen as exotic a few years ago,
such as the cloning of target strains of DNA for lab work (PCR) or the purification of
DNA and other important molecules, are now widely available. A similar
phenomenon has occurred within the genomics field. Providing access to libraries of
genetic sequence, a high-profile activity during the mid 1990s, has become only a
few years later a readily available service. The high profile (and value added firms)
today are moving into the „functional genomics“ field, which attempts to embed
particular genetic sequences with broad indicators of the biological activities with
which these genes are likely to be associated.  Competition within particular product
markets allows pharmaceutical firms and other major customers to negotiate lower
prices for services than those expected by the biotechnology firm, especially for
larger contracts or high-volume purchases. To overcome the commodification
problem, firms working within these areas must work to simplify such processes even
further, often through integrating several such technologies into a sophisticated
„platform“ that can be sold or licensed to customers.
A third technological characteristic, the degree of cumulativeness or
technological trajectory, relates to the volatility of technology within the firm’s field of
research. Technological trajectories vary on a scale from discrete to cumulative (see
Breschi and Malerba, 1997: 135-136). Discrete technological trajectories have two
components. First, the competencies needed to organize sequential research
projects tend not to be stable; i.e. in a series of research projects that is necessary to
bring a product to market, it is often difficult for a firm to foresee the particular
competencies it will need to organize research project „B“ before the results of
project „A“ are completed.  This means that the firm must be able to quickly
reconstitute its competency structure over the course of its research endeavors.
Second, due to the radical or novel nature of many emerging technologies, a high
percentage of research projects will fail to meet their goals. Cumulative research
trajectories, in contrast, are not competency destroying. The risk of particular
research projects failing is lower, and competencies tend to remain stable and
predictable across the sequence of projects leading to the development of saleable
products.
Technological trajectories within therapeutics tend to be extremely volatile or
discrete. Firms often are constituted on the basis of theoretical expertise pertaining
to particular therapeutic research areas, and then develop or acquire any number of
particular application technologies needed to pursue projects as research
progresses. Ethnographic accounts consistently document the widely changing
course of therapeutic firm research activities over time as results develop, which
often leads to repeated changes in the competency structure of the firm (see Werth,
1993). While technological uncertainty is a prime determinant of the high failure rate
of particular projects, the high prestige and financial value generated by important
research results leads to the development of „racing“ activity across several firms (or
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networks of several firms) to develop technologies targeted at particular diseases.
These races usually have several clear stages, e.g. the understanding of key
mechanisms involved in disease; the discovery of key proteins or other molecules
involved in disease processes; the discovery of possible routes of interdiction; the
discovery of the molecular structure of key proteins/molecules or the discovery of
genetic sequences of these molecules; the creation of candidate compounds; clinical
testing, leading finally to regulatory approval.
Failure rates and time horizons, as seen in table 4, are high throughout the drug
development process. No approval probability statistics exist for the discovery stage,
as results here are wildly uncertain and varied across firms with particular research
approaches. Firms using high throughput screening and other combinatorial
chemistry techniques to automate traditional „chemical“ screening processes may
only generate one „hit“ in tens of thousands of tests, but can run these tests very
economically on a per test basis. Other firm using „rational drug design“ techniques
might spend many moths if not years on the construction of particular drug
candidates, but through doing so achieve a much higher percentage of candidates
that can enter into pre-clinical testing.
Platform technology firms tend to develop more stable or cumulative
technologies. Most firms begin with expertise in one or more process technologies
that can be applied to a particular group of common molecular biology research
activities. They then hope to expand into related areas on a sequential basis based
on learning externalities generated through the completion of particular projects. For
example, one of the first and the most successful German biotechnology firms,
Qiagen, was founded in 1984 on the basis of the founder’s doctoral thesis on the
creation of nucleic acid filtration devices. Over the last 15 years the firm has
generated over 225 products that largely represent extensions of this initial
technology. While competition is also fierce in the platform technology segment, the
creation service-oriented end-user relationships leads to more market fragmentation
across firms, muting the winner-take-all atmosphere generated within many research
races within therapeutics.
A final technological characteristic concerns the type of technological knowledge
that is generated through research and development projects, the knowledge
property (see Winter, 1987). Once a particular research project is completed, a key
question becomes whether research results and other assets developed within the
project can easily be assessed by the firm’s management and other outsiders to the
particular project. If research results can be codified, then financiers and
management can more easily monitor the activities of scientists and technicians
within the firm. If research results remain tacit, then it becomes difficult for
management and outsiders of the firm to assess the value of research results over
the short to medium term, until final products can be completed and sold.
Furthermore, work groups hold high amounts of „know-how“ that cannot be easily
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transferred to other employees or used as easily assessed intellectual property that
can leveraged for financial investments.
Most knowledge within therapeutics research quickly becomes codified and
assessable to participants across a research field. At the end of each „race“ or
research stage the winners develop codified intellectual property which, we will see,
is often leveraged for additional research funding or sold on the market. Losers
usually receive the results of each stage in terms of codified knowledge (conference
presentations, journal articles or patent applications) and can decide if they want to
enter the next stage. In addition to scientific publications and patent documents, a
number of industry analysts publish newsletters and quarterly „scorecards“ tracking
the progress of particular firms.
Platform technology firms often generate considerable long-term tacit knowledge
within research groups. This is strongly influenced by the more cumulative nature of
technological advance within most platform technology firms. While most
therapeutics firms organize R&D along clear research goals, platform technology
firms often generate revenues through serial projects that involve the application of
the firm’s core technologies to help solve particular problems of customers. Over
time, the scientists and technicians involved in these projects make incremental
improvements to technologies and add new competencies, most of which feed back
into the firm’s core technological know-how.  Incremental learning processes
conduce towards the accumulation of tacit knowledge within particular teams of
scientists and technicians. Appropriability concerns also create a motive to avoid
codification of important technical knowledge. When intellectual property is weak,
firms have an incentive to create trade secrets that cannot be easily gleaned by
outsiders. While the German firm Qiagen, for example, has patented many of its
filtration technologies, the long-term applied nature of much of its research has
created considerable tacit knowledge within the firm’s R&D department that which
the firm sees as a barrier to entry, especially when its key patents begin to expire in
the next several years.
Using these technological characteristics, it is possible to identify three major
classes of persistent organizational risks that the actors involved must resolve if
organizational structures to innovate within the segment are to be reliably created
and sustained. These risks include: a) problems created by the destruction of
competencies within the firm as research progresses, b) financial difficulties, and c)
dilemmas concerning employee motivation.
Competency destruction risks. This risk is primarily determined by the
technological trajectory, and is much higher in therapeutics than most platform
technologies. Most biotech start-ups involved in therapeutics research eventually fail
and either enter into bankruptcy or are sold to other firms (see Senker, 1996; Powell,
1996). Therapeutics research, even within successful firms, is often characterized by
patterns of internal competency destruction. As a result, the career risk of working
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within any given biotech firm must be low. Furthermore, as Powell (1996), Pennan
(1997) and others have discussed, therapeutics based research is a network based
industry. Innovation is dependent on the flow of knowledge between university labs,
start-up research firms, and large pharmaceutical firms. While joint research
projects, strategic alliances and so forth facilitate this exchange of knowledge, these
network externalities are also supported by the rapid movement of scientists and
technicians across firms.
When competency destruction is high, asset recycling becomes an important
organizational problem (Bahrami and Evans, 1995). Therapeutics firms must be able
to quickly reconstitute their competency structures over the course of its research
endeavors. They must have access to a pool of scientists, technicians, and other
specialists with known reputations in highly specialized areas that can quickly be
recruited to work on research projects. Because many projects will fail, coordination
mechanisms to „recycle“ sophisticated assets across the matrix of public and private
research clusters must be developed. If asset recycling is difficult, then specialists
may choose not to commit to firms with high-risk research projects, for fear that if the
project fails the value of his or her research assets could significantly decline.
Similarly, if extensive lateral career mobility across firms and non-profit research
labs is not supported, then network externalities driving innovative research clusters
would be difficult to sustain.
Financial risks. While therapeutics and platform technology firms both require
significant ongoing capital investments, they tend to generate different financial
risks. Frequent failures and very high investment rates generated by the nature of
technological volatility and short-term competition across research races create
substantial financial risks for therapeutics firms. While reliable financing figures for
each stage are not readily available, most industry guides estimate that the total cost
of discovering and developing a new drug is between $100 and $200 million
(PhRMA,1997). These costs increase dramatically as products are discovered and
developed; while the research required for drug discovery typically can be financed
through a few million dollars per year, the cost curve dramatically escalates once
potential target compounds are discovered and clinical trials involving human
participants begin. The 7-10 year time horizon between discovery and a new drug
reaches the market compounds these risks
These extreme financial risks may be offset somewhat if firms codify key
scientific results into intellectual property that is strongly protected through patents.
Results generated through all aspects of therapeutics research may, if the firm
chooses to codify and release the information, be widely reported and monitored
throughout the research community. This allows investors the possibility of
developing mechanisms to monitor each firm and gradually extend financing as
warranted through positive results. Furthermore, while the odds of successfully
bringing a product to market are low, the payoffs can be astronomical. Consumers
have repeatedly been willing to support very high prices for effective new treatments,
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creating billion dollar plus returns for some drugs. Risks can also be pooled through
forming joint ventures, in particular with large pharmaceutical firms, which have
dedicated in-house development expertise, particularly in latter stage clinical trials,
negotiating the FDA approval process, and in marketing and distribution.
While platform technologies vary in the financial risks involved, they are
generally lower than for therapeutics firms. The technology commodification problem
caused by relatively low long-term levels of appropriability tends to weaken the
earnings potential of innovations and creates pressure for firms to continually
improve existing products or introduce new ones. Initial capital costs are often
higher, especially for firms that require access to sophisticated lab equipment (e.g.
gene sequencing devices or dedicated machinery for the production of products).
However, many platform technology firms avoid this problem by beginning with
relatively modest amounts of seed capital, which is used to rent time on
sophisticated lab equipment owned by the basic research laboratories from which
the new enterprise is spun out. They can then attempt to arrange larger amounts of
finance once the new firm has reached a critical mass of customers and services to
justify the construction of sophisticated capital assets in-house. Moreover, because
most platform technology companies aim to sell services or products to other labs,
time horizons are much shorter before the firm begins to generate income flows, and
there are usually no significant regulatory approval costs and subsequent delays. An
additional tactic is to embark on so-called „hybrid“ strategies, focusing on a mix of
short-term service oriented projects to generate cash flow, but also some medium to
long-range products aimed at larger technology markets with potentially larger
returns. For example, many genomics firms start by selling access to genetic
libraries and related sequencing services to labs engaged in therapeutic research,
but hope to eventually develop the financial backing and in-house competencies to
pursue their own therapeutic projects.
Employee motivation risks: Once a firm has obtained the necessary human
and financial resources, it still must create organizational structures necessary to
innovate. Because most biotechnology firms are small, developing adequate formal
organizational rule systems is usually only a minor problem; semi-autonomous and
largely self-governing research groups are the norm within virtually all biotechnology
firms in both segments. The key risk factor rather involves creating adequate
incentives for employees to commit to what are often demanding, extremely
competitive and time-intensive work environments that exist within both therapeutics
and platform technology firms. Employee motivation problems are perhaps the major
reason why most biotechnology firms are small (rarely more than 50-100 people,
including administrative staff, and usually much smaller than this during formative
years). Small numbers facilitates mutual monitoring and may, if the managers
choose, be used to create ownership or remuneration structures that give each
employee a large stake within the success of the firm.  In addition to this general
commitment problem, employee motivation difficulties may be also created by „hold-
up“ risks created by the extreme specialization of knowledge within biotech firms
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and, in some cases, problems created when employees are asked to invest in firm-
specific skills that have a limited value outside the firm (see Miller, 1992).
Employee motivation can be particularly challenging for platform technology
firms. While management must create a high-powered work environment to
successfully compete, the existing of long-term tacit knowledge means that
managers or other outsiders cannot easily monitor the activities of particular work
groups or develop simple contractual structures rewarding employees for short-term
achievements. Long-term relational contracts must be developed between
researchers and the management and owners of firms in order to create incentives
for research groups to accurately report their results. When employees spend long
amounts of time with the firm, there is the risk that the cumulative nature of
technological progress may generate substantial firm-specific know-how. If the firm
should collapse the value of the employees skills might be discounted on the open
labor market. Knowing this, the firm’s management, once the employee made
investments in firm-specific skills, could credibly demand that the employee accept
remuneration at this discounted rate. While doing so seems unlikely given the
overarching desire from management to create high-powered incentives for
employees to work in work-intensive environments, should the firm encounter
financial difficulties, employees with substantial firm-specific skills could be at a
disadvantage compared to employees that have only invested in general skills that
are readily saleable to other firms.
Employee motivation problems within therapeutics firms are somewhat mitigated
by the ability to codify most research results. The chief employee motivation problem
within therapeutic firms is creating high-powered work environments necessary to
succeed in extremely competitive research races. Management also face a concern
that scientists may attempt to „hold up“ the firm through refusing to codify the
knowledge until particular demands are met. This typically leads to the creation of
very high-powered incentives for particular researchers. Researchers may be given
formal incentive contracts developed by managers whose value depends on the
generation of particular codified research results. Another common tactic is to allow
scientists to share the limelight generated by important discoveries through
encouraging scientists to publish important results in high-profile scientific journals.
Overall, the ability to codify most research results means that long-term tacit
knowledge problems are less frequent, while the turbulent nature of technological
change and subsequent high recycling of employee assets across the community of
firms lowers the firm-specific knowledge risk.
Table 5 summarizes this general discussion.
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4. The institutional determinants of organizational governance within
the US and German biotechnology industries.
We have now examined organizational dilemmas underlying innovative activity
within the therapeutics and platform technology segments of the biotechnology
industry. Though „internal“ technological and market contingencies may present
some obvious governance mechanisms the actors involved may choose to develop
(such as, for example, the ability of therapeutics firms to use codified knowledge as
a device to structure employee performance incentives), the core institutional
argument is that firms must chiefly draw upon resources external to the firm if they
are to successfully resolve their organizational dilemmas. In this respect, institutions
may be regarded as „tool kits“ (Swidler, 1986) actors may draw upon to create
governance mechanisms needed to structure their social interactions.
In general, the resource orchestration view focuses on the role of policy in
creating the substantive forms of coordination needed to compete within particular
sectors. Which actors must be present, what broad organizational forms should they
adopt, and what resources do they need? In both the US and German biotechnology
cases particular policies have had a determining influence on the development of
commercial biotechnology. We have already noted the importance of German
policies in stimulating the formation of new commercial biotechnology clusters. In the
United States commentators have long noted the importance of extremely large
federal grants dispersed by the National Institute of Health in fostering the US lead
in bio-medical science (Kenney, 1986). Furthermore, a key technology policy
developed in the late 1970s, the Bayl-Dole Act, transferred ownership of all
intellectual property funded through federal research grants to universities, creating
the stimulus needed for most universities to organize technology transfer offices
(Abramson et al., 1997).
However, there is also a second, „relational“ level of analysis: Do sustainable
incentive structures for all participants within the entrepreneurial firm and its
immediate network exist? The organizational dilemmas commonly found within
therapeutics and platform technology firms are primarily of this relational variety.
While technology policies can sometimes help reduce some organizational risks,
particularly with regards to finance, I will argue that economy-wide national
institutional frameworks are the primary resources firms draw upon when creating
the competencies needed to resolve each of the three core organizational dilemmas
within commercial biotechnology. German and US national institutional frameworks
tend to advantage different types of organizational solutions to the organizational
dilemmas discussed in relation to biotechnology. This will help explain why German
firms have tended to gravitate so strongly towards the platform technology segment
while American firms, though strong in both areas, tend to be particularly dominant in
therapeutics. I first discuss the orchestration of innovative competencies for
therapeutics within the United States and then turn to the German case.
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While the commercial innovation networks that have evolved in the United
States are broadly consistent with the technological market characteristics
embedded within the therapeutics sector, it would be misleading to suggest that the
system evolved towards its current form based on efficiency or other considerations.
Starting with Genentech, the original biotech start-up formed in 1976, biotechnology
firms quickly became enmeshed within a network of largely market based
relationships invented previously to support the semiconductor and computer
industries (see Kenney, 1986). As a result, models of financing, firm-organization,
and corporate governance for start-ups were largely imposed onto the new industry,
rather than being developed for the industry. Because institutional frameworks
governing most substantive areas within the United States are broadly enabling in
nature and tend to support market forms of business coordination, it is not surprising
that such mechanisms were chosen. The US therapeutics sector has thrived largely
because market based governance mechanisms can be easily adopted to resolve
the major organizational dilemmas underpinning these activities. This claim is
supported through briefly considering each of the three organizational problem areas
discussed earlier:
Competency destruction. In the United States the deregulated nature of most
labor law has resulted in the creation of an extremely active labor market.
Particularly in California (but generally throughout the US), courts have refused to
enforce „competition clauses“ inserted into employment contracts to prevent
poaching. While firms can ask employees to sign non-disclosure agreements
covering specific technologies, scientists and managers are generally free to move
from firm to firm as they see fit, while managers can shed assets through hiring and
firing as circumstances within the firm develop. This has facilitated the creation of
extensive head-hunting operations within most US technology clusters and, within
firms, the organization of career paths within firms based on the probability of
frequent employee turnover. Active labor markets facilitate rapid asset recycling to
compensate for competency destruction created by the high rate of firm failure. (see
Saxenian, 1996 for a general discussion of career-paths in Silicon Valley).
Financial Risks. Virtually all American therapeutic firms are initially funded by
venture capitalists (see Florida and Kenney, 1986). Venture capitalists are usually
willing to accept high technological uncertainty and short to medium term financial
losses in return for the prospect of very large gains in the future. However, they also
require the ability to segment the R&D activities of start-ups into several milestones
with codified research results (high-prestige scientific publications and patents) that
can be used to make further investment decisions and eventually become leverage
to take the firm public. The codified nature of most scientific results in the
therapeutics field easily fit into venture capital models of corporate finance.
There are important institutional reasons why the venture capital market is so
large in the US. First, very substantial private legal competencies exist and, due to
the „enabling“ nature of ownership and contract law, can be used to create
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sophisticated legal structures used to support risky new ventures (see Easterbrook
and Fishel, 1991). These include the high-powered performance incentives for
managers and scientists discussed above. Second, and probably most important, in
the United States the property rights structure of firms is primarily financial in
structure, and rooted in large capital markets (e.g. NASDAQ, NYSE). A liquid market
for corporate control is critical for venture capitalists, as it creates a viable „exit
option“ via initial public offerings and mergers or acquisitions by other biomedical
companies. Without this exit option, it is difficult for venture capitalists to diversify
risks across several investments or create a viable refinancing mechanism.
Successful start-ups will be given supplementary „mezzanine“ financing and
eventually taken public through an initial public offering (IPO) or sold to a larger
pharmaceutical company, usually creating a very high return for the venture
capitalists. These profits may be used to offset the losses on other companies and
thus make a portfolio strategy more viable. Finally, by taking a firm public within a
few years, venture capitalists create a viable refinancing mechanism. They can use
the profits from IPOs to seed new ventures as well as provide secondary funding for
other start-ups (for example, to take promising candidate compounds into clinical
testing).
Employee motivation. Short-term performance milestones generated by the
general pattern of competition within therapeutics and demanded by venture
capitalists complements the creation of high-powered performance incentives for
employees. Most companies motivate employees primarily with share-options,
coupled with the announced intention of owners and venture capitalist to take the
firm public within a few years. In the cases of successful firms that have gone public,
share options can be worth from tens of thousands of dollars to junior staff to millions
to senior scientists and owner/managers. The prospect of large financial rewards
helps align the private incentives of scientists with those of companies and is a
prime reason why US high-tech firms have become associated with extremely long
work-weeks and general dedication to projects. Most technology companies also
have annual performance reviews that are largely based on individual performance.
Within therapeutics firms, this is usually pegged to each scientist’s contribution to
codified intellectual property developed within the firm. To aid the longer-term
reputation should they reenter the labor market, scientists are also regularly allowed
to publish key results in scientific journals under their name along with the firm’s.
To fully appreciate the short-term, contingent nature of these relationships, a
more systematic view should be taken. Each link of the competency chain must be
credible before all actors will commit to working within a particular entrepreneurial
project. For example, as Zucker and Darby (1997) have shown, successful biotech
firms, particularly in their formative stages, are usually associated with „star-
scientists“ from universities that contribute seed technology, provide informal
consulting, and serve on the firm’s scientific advisory board. Fledging firms with
high-profile scientific backing are the most likely to gain the attention of venture
capitalists with access to generous financing, management know-how, and, of often
critical importance to newer firms, the reputation needed to persuade high quality
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managers and scientists to work with the firm. Having this combination of assets will
enhance the probability of the firm succeeding in early research races, and through
doing so gaining access to further venture capital, and eventually access to the
investment banking community as well as joint ventures with large pharmaceutical
firms.
While such virtuous circles are common with therapeutic start-ups, they can
quickly become vicious. If the firm cannot recruit high quality researchers or cannot
attract start-scientists on its scientific advisory board, then it is unlikely that venture
capitalists will support the firm. Similarly, when firms fail to meet important
milestones the short-term and market driven nature of their organization facilitates
their quick unraveling. Once a firm faces difficulties, venture capitalists will often
decline to extend further financing, often forcing firms to sell valuable intellectual
property at fire-sale prices to other biotech firms or pharmaceutical companies to
stay alive. This could quickly lead to further difficulties as key researchers within the
firm jump to other enterprises and star scientists affiliated with the firm turn their
attention elsewhere. Such is the essence of a short-term, incentive based
contracting scheme.
If, for institutional or other reasons, one or more links within the competency
chain of an emerging therapeutics research enterprise is not credible, then it is
unlikely that other participants will commit to a particular project. This is the key
factor explaining why German firms have not gravitated towards the therapeutics
area. Up until as recently as the mid-1990s, institutional obstacles created major
hurdles to the creation of viable governance mechanisms in each of the three areas
discussed. While minor institutional reforms and sector-specific technology policies
have lessened some restraints, key problems, particularly in the area of arranging
human resource competencies within quickly changing technology areas, continue to
undermine the viability of most therapeutics projects in Germany. Having explained
the market-based construction of American biotechnology firms, we can now better
interpret developments within Germany.
The one area where economy-wide institutional reforms have benefited
entrepreneurial firms is finance. While large German firms continue to be governed
through a stake-holder model of company law, the management of many large
companies have in recent years developed an interest in tapping international
financial markets and broadening their shareholder base in order to generate
shareholder value pressures, stock-option schemes and other mechanisms to
increase short-term performance pressures within the firm. This has lead to an
upsurge of investment banking activities and finance in Germany throughout the
1990s and facilitated in 1997 the creation of a NASDAQ-modeled stock exchange for
technology companies, the Neuer Markt. While only one biotechnology firm, a
genomics company, has had a successful IPO on the Neuer Markt, this market has
successfully supported several dozen equity listings of German firms in other
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technology sectors, as well as a secondary listing for the German platform
technology Qiagen.
Venture capital has until very recently been underdeveloped in Germany
because of a lack of institutional mechanisms to support the rapid growth of firms
through IPOs and other equity market activities as well as a credible „exit option“ for
venture capital syndicates. Spurred also by large government matching grants for
new technology firms, the development of capital market institutions to support
equity based growth strategies has lead to the inflow of venture capital firms. While
only two venture capital firms existed within Germany at the beginning of the 1990s,
over 15 companies had set up shop in Germany by early 1999 (Mietzsch, 1999).
Due to the liberalization of German share-holding law in March 1998, most German
biotech start-up firms offer stock-options in order to foster intense work environments
and are intent on leverage the firm’s equity for further financing along American-style
high-technology growth trajectories. While high capital gains taxes on stock options
somewhat diminish their strength, German high-technology companies can now
successfully mimic American-style employee motivation schemes.
Why, then, have the vast majority of the hundreds of new German biotechnology
firms that have been set up largely in response to these institutional reforms and
accompanying technology policies not adopted therapeutics strategies? The primary
reason is that company and labor law continue to advantage the construction of
organizational structures that are dramatically at odds with those that have
traditionally been best suited for therapeutic firms. In addition, the structure of the
German venture capital might be pushing firms into lower-risk market segments.
German technology firms face difficulties in obtaining the necessary human
resource competencies to innovate in volatile fields with frequent technological
change. Labor market institutions pose obstacles to the creation of coordination
mechanisms needed to compensate for a high rate competency destruction and firm
failure. Large labor markets for experienced scientists and managers simply do not
exist in Germany. Both sides of the „hire and fire“ equation needed to support short-
term incentive contracting are muted. While large German firms can sell entire
subsidiaries or business units or send some lower-productivity older employees into
early retirement, codetermination law makes it difficult for firms to lay-off individual
employees or groups of employees as part of the „normal“ course of business.
Because labor markets for mid-career managerial and scientific expertise are
relatively underdeveloped in Germany, the asset recycling mechanisms needed for
therapeutics firms to successfully compete in technology races over the medium to
long term do not exist. As a result, the risk of „jumping ship“ from an established
large company or prestigious university professorship to a start-up firm is extremely
high. The lack of experienced managers and scientists willing to work within
entrepreneurial start-ups is widely seen as the key constraint on the further
enlargement of the German biotechnology industry (Economist, 1998).
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The continuing development of German biotechnology is unlikely to lessen the
asset recycling problem. Unless employees throughout the German bio-medical
commercial and scientific research community begin to accept short-term incentive
contracting arrangements, the extremely flexible labor markets to support
therapeutics strategies seem unlikely to develop. While pharmaceutical firms in
Germany have undergone recent waves of downsizing their corporate staffs, they
remain strongly embedded within German company and codetermination laws that
encourage large firms to offer long-term employment and related company
organizational strategies (see Becker et. al., 1999 for a discussion of Hoechst’s
difficulties in this area). Though it is too early to confirm empirically, most platform
technology firms in Germany are likely to develop long-term employment patterns
too in order to develop relational contracting structures with employees. If most
German biotechnology firms become relatively stable with low failure rates, then it is
unlikely that they will eventually provide access to new pools of expert labor to work
within therapeutics firms, since employment patterns will likely become
predominately long-term. This could limit job mobility across these firms, especially if
many employees over the years invest in firm specific skills. Turning to universities,
while large numbers of German university professors have developed consulting
relationships with Germany’s new biotechnology firms, as of late 1998 no professor
has been enticed to leave his or her university chair to work full-time within a firm.
The primary source of employees (and entrepreneurs) for Germany’s new
biotechnology firms have been PhD students and postdocs from German bio-medical
university labs who currently face extremely dim employment prospects within
German universities.
While financing for entrepreneurial firms now exists within Germany, the
governance of these investments is problematic. In addition to „silent“ venture capital
guaranteed by the federal government, much venture capital in Germany has been
organized through „innovation funds“ administered by the banking sector, and in
particular the public savings and investment banks (see survey in Mietsch, 1999:
241-255). As pointed out by Tylecote and Conesa (1999), banks in „insider“
dominated corporate governance systems tend to have excellent knowledge of
particular firms, but usually do not have the detailed industry knowledge that is
necessary for investors to channel money into higher-risk technologies. Rather,
financing for successful higher-risk activities is generally provided by specialized
venture capitalist houses, often in conjunction with industry „angels“ that have
detailed technical and market expertise within particular industries. The growth of
German venture capital has been spurred by financial subsidies for start-ups. While
there do exist several credible venture capital houses in Germany, the extensive
involvement of public funds in syndicates backing most firms creates limits on the
reservoir of experience the firm can draw upon through its venture capital partners.
Furthermore, public officials involved in the administration of federal subsidies as
well as officials of public banks, when interviewed as part of field research
conducted in early 1999, consistently stated that „sustainability“ was their core
concern. Above all else, public officials want to avoid large numbers of corporate
failures. In addition to risking moderate sums of public money, the political backlash
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created by a large number of high-tech failures could be embarrassing. Lacking the
industry expertise to take an active role in the governance of these firms, it is not
surprising that so many projects have been steered into lower risk market segments.
Finally, German financial markets for high-tech firms, while growing, are still
embryonic compared to those in the United States or even the United Kingdom. The
lack of a viable „exit option“ has limited the development of dedicated venture capital
financing, and especially so-called mezzanine financing to fund the expansion of
start-up firms in preparation for going public. While the early success of the Neuer
Markt has been a positive development, the ability of investors to successfully adopt
a portfolio approach when investing in extremely high-risk start-ups is far from
proven. During 1998 the value of the UK biotech index, which is heavily populated
by therapeutics firms, declined by half due to several unexpected failures, including
a late stage clinical trial setback by British Biotech, the UK’s leading biotech firm
(see SG Cowen, 1998). Few German observers believe the Neuer Markt could easily
absorb similar volatility. Until the market has successfully funded the development of
several biotechnology firms, which will likely emerge from pure platform technology
segments or, at most, from genomics firms venturing into limited therapeutics
research, it is unlikely that investors will be likely to support large numbers of
therapeutics firms in Germany.
It is this mix of entrepreneurial pressures and growth opportunities combined
with „normal“ patterns of primarily long-term and relationally based company
organization that characterizes most of the new German high-tech enterprises. Seen
in this light, it is clearer why so many of Germany’s new biotechnology firms have
headed into the platform technology field. Most platform technology firms must be
embedded within financial and corporate governance institutions that can support
entrepreneurial growth strategies, but due to the complexity of the employee
motivational problems, require the formation of longer-term relational contracts with
employees to encourage them to invest in firm specific knowledge and reveal tacit
knowledge to management. Furthermore, the cumulative pattern of technology
development helps reduce the employment risk of joining a platform technology
start-up. Government technology policies are ideally suited to these firms, since they
provide incentives for universities to spin-off technologies and provide seed capital
grants to incubate fledging new enterprises. Once firms begin to establish
themselves on the market, venture capitalists can and have provided access to
resources needed to fuel growth. Because German institutional frameworks strongly
support the investment in firm-specific and long-term tacit knowledge within firms, it
is not surprising that so many German firms have selected this area. Because they
are embedded within a superior institutional environment, German firms could
eventually outperform American firms in platform technologies.
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5. Conclusion
Institutional change has clearly occurred within Germany. However, analysis of the
activities of Germany’s new firms supports a view of „accommodation“ or incremental
adaptation of German institutional frameworks to support an expansion of
entrepreneurial technological firms within the economy, but not a fundamental shift
towards a „hybrid“ model as implied by the resource orchestration view. Germany’s
new technology policies have facilitated important extensions within the business
system that have, for the first time, allowed the systematic promotion of
entrepreneurial technology companies. However, the dominant strategies of market
specialization and company organizational patterns found within these companies
have been strongly influenced by incentives and constraints created by long-
established national institutional structures. Most generally, German institutions tend
to advantage innovation patterns in which knowledge cannot easily be codified and
for which research trajectories are cumulative and have high degrees of firm-specific
knowledge. Institutional frameworks within the United States advantage the
construction of commercial innovative activities for which there is a large amount of
competency destruction due to the discrete nature of technology trajectories but
knowledge can be codified.
While the discussion has focused on biotechnology, firms in other German
technology sectors exhibit similar characteristics. For example, a recent study of the
emerging German software industry revealed that very few German firms have
mimicked common strategies employed by US firms targeted at designing products
for extremely large, „blockbuster“ markets. Rather, most German firms, following the
lead established by the German software giant SAP, have targeted a wide variety of
niche markets within the enterprise software business. This segment of the software
industry has a technological and market profile almost identical to that in
biotechnology platform technologies (see Casper et al., 1999).
The implications of this analysis for public policy are unfortunately not clear-cut.
A key concept underlying the varieties of capitalism approach is that of comparative
institutional advantage (Soskice, 1997). According to this concept, differences in
institutional architectures across the advanced industrial economies advantage the
creation of different company organizational structures necessarily to perform well in
some groups of industries, but create constraints hindering performance in others.
While the biotechnology case certainly supports this view, it carries the strong
implication that little or no change is possible, or even necessary. However, German
technology policies have successfully stretched the fabric of the prevailing
institutional frameworks into new directions. The forging of new technology transfer
links through the BioRegio programs combined with financial subsidies and reforms
to promote the creation of high-technology corporate governance have combined to
create extensions of the German model. However, we have also seen that this
extension is strongly path dependent on prevailing forms of organization within the
German economy, and in no sense can be described as a „break“ with the long-
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established „DQP“ model of company organization. While changes to the German
technology transfer system have been clearly helpful, it is quite possible that many
of Germany’s new platform technology firms may have emerged without extensive
public financial subsidies. Technology promotion is possible, but policies should be
crafted in ways that are broadly consistent with the country’s prevailing comparative
institutional advantage.
An important theme for institutional research is to establish theoretically useful
analysis that can more easily incorporate changes such as those presently occurring
in Germany into normal categories of analysis. A middle ground, so to say, must be
established between extremely rigid institutional theorizing implying that little change
is likely, and analysis suggestion that extreme discontinuity is possible. Static
descriptions of existing institutional environments must be combined with micro-level
accounts tracing how firms, governments, and other actors within the economy
engage and at times reconfigure the institutional tool-kits at their disposal.
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Table 1: National institutional frameworks in Germany and the United States
Germany United States
Labor law Regulative (coordinated
system of wage bargaining;
bias towards long-term
employee careers in
companies)
Liberal (decentralized wage
bargaining; few barriers to
employee turnover)
Company law Stakeholder system (two
tier board system plus
codetermination rights for
employees)
Shareholder system
(Minimal legal constraints
on company organization)
Financial system Primarily bank-based with
close links to stakeholder
system of corporate
governance; no hostile
market for corporate
control.
Primarily capital-market
system, closely linked to
market for corporate control
and financial ownership and
control of firms.
31
Table 2: Recent German technology policies
Issue-area „Obstacle“ Policy
Technology transfer Universities in Germany
do not own intellectual
property have thus have
little incentive or
resources to organize
technology transfer
offices.
Create government
sponsored technology
transfer offices, technology
parks, and services nearby
universities.
Intellectual property Professors own most IP
generated within
university labs but lack
resources to
commercialize IP.
Introduce government
subsidies and hire
consultants to help
professors pay patenting
costs and commercialize
technologies.
Start-up firms Fledging start-ups in
Germany lack access to
high-risk venture capital
and low-cost support
infrastructure.
Introduce subsidies for „pre-
competitive“ research, and
„public venture capital“ in the
form of „silent partnerships“
for start-ups; build
technology parks and
„incubator labs“ to provide
sophisticated infrastructure
for start-ups at subsidized
cost.
Start-up firm
development and
expansion
German financial laws
have prohibited the use
of equity-based stock-
option schemes while
structure of capital
markets makes it difficult
for high-risk technology
firms to raise funds
through public offerings.
Finance reforms allow firms
to buy and sell own shares
and introduction of a new
stock market with lower
listing requirements for
technology firms.
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Table 3: Bio-medical related market segments
Category Definition Examples
Therapeutics Develop products
to improve the
treatment of
disease
Apply a variety of molecular
biology methodologies to
discover/design drugs
Diagnostics Develop tools to
help identify
diseases
Develop antibodies for use in
diagnostic procedures; Some
use of genetic technologies
(e.g. PCR) to test for genetic
diseases
Platform
Technologies
Create enabling
technologies with
broad application
Genetic sequencing or
engineering services; the
creation of consumables for
use in molecular biology lab
procedures; combinatorial
chemistry and other
automation technologies
Contract
Research /
Manufacturing
Perform
customized
biochemical
related services
for other
companies
The manufacturing of
customized biochemical
products; specialized
services such as equipment
servicing or quality control
certification
Source: Industry definitions from Ernst and Young 1998a: 5-6.
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Table 4: Time horizon and approval rates for therapeutic drug development
Drug development
stage
Time horizon Probability of
approval
Discovery 2-3 years
Pre-clinical 1 year 5%*
Clinical stage 1 ½ - 1 year 23%
Clinical stage 2 1-2 years 31%
Clinical stage 3 1-2 years 64%
FDA Approval ½ - 1 year 75%
Source: SG Cowen 1998, pg. 22, 33;*this figure from BIA, 1999: 19.
Table 5: Organizational dilemmas within biotechnology market segments
Therapeutics Platform technologies
Competency
destruction risks
High – Due to discrete
nature of technology;
asset recycling a key
problem
Lower – Due to
cumulative nature of
technology and lower
failure rate
Financial risks High – Due to failure
rate, long time horizons,
and high „burn rate“;
however codified
knowledge facilitates
short-term monitoring
Low to Medium –
Failure risk lower and
time horizons shorter,
but tacit knowledge
makes monitoring
difficult and many
product segments have
become extremely
competitive
Employee motivation
risks
Medium – Firms face
potential „hold up“
problem and must
create high-powered
incentives due to racing
nature of research. But
once scientists codify
results performance may
be easily monitored.
High - Long-term tacit
knowledge makes
monitoring difficult and
cumulative research
trajectories may create
firm-specific knowledge
risks for employees
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